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I. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial Court's denial of Appellant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the dismissal of Appellant's Declaratory 
Judgment action and U.R.C.P. 60(b) action for relief from judgment, 
rejecting Petitioner's claim the Utah divorce laws to be declared 
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Troxel v. 
Granville was proper. Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no 
material issue of fact exists and the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law, and is reviewed under a "correction 
of error" standard without deference to the trial Court's 
determination. Malibu Investment Corp. v. Sparks, 2000 Ut. 30 § 12 
996 P.2d 104; Larsen v. Park City Mun. Corp. 955 P.2d 343 (Ut. 
1998); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Ut. 1994) (R. 85-103; R. 123-
136; R. 151-155; R. 156-162; R. 276, Tr. July 30, 2001, P. 41-44) 
2. Whether granting Respondent's Motion for Rule 11 
Sanctions, awarding attorney's fees and costs to Respondent by the 
trial Court was proper in view of Petitioner's attempt to 
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re-litigate by his declaratory action, issues and matters of the 
prior divorce action that had been ruled upon, denied on Appeals, 
and were res judicata, is reviewed under a "correction of error" 
standard. Clark v. Deloitte, 34 P.3d 209 (S 2001) (R. 45-48; R. 
49-57; R. 59-70; R. 71-79; R. 276, Tr. 15; Tr. 41-44 July 30, 2001) 
3. The trial Court's denial of Petitioner's Motion to Alter 
or Amend Judgment, Rule 59(e) U.R.C.P. was proper and is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. Hudema v. Carpenter, 989 
P.2d 491 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999) (R. 187-205; R. 206-225; R. 226-229; 
Tr. Oct. 15, 2001 P. 5-6; P. 8-12; P. 20-24; P. 44-45) 
4. Constitutional issues including due process are questions 
of law which are reviewed for correctness. In re S.L.E. 2001, Ut. 
App. 183, 27 P.3d 583 (R. 187-189; R. 276, Tr. 42) 
III. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES, RULES, ETC. 
(a) Utah Code Annotated, 78-33-1, et seq., Amended 
set forth in the Addendum hereto. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
A. Rule 11, URCP(b)(l) and (2) set forth in Appellant's 
Brief; and 
(c) Sanctions; (1)(A) and (B) set forth in Appellant's 
Brief; and 
(2) Nature of Sanctions; Limitations (A) and (B) set 
forth in Appellant's Brief; and 
(3) Order. Set forth in Appellant's Brief. 
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Rule 12, URCP(b)(6): HOW PRESENTED. 
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief 
in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross 
claim, or third party claim shall be asserted in the 
responsive pleadings thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may, at the option of the 
pleader, be made by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Rule 56, URCP: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the 
action or after service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted or 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for 
summary judgment in his favor as to all or any 
part thereof. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion, 
memorandum and affidavit shall be filed and served 
in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory 
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone, although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
Rule 59 URCP: NEW TRIAL; AMENDMENTS OF JUDGMENT 
(a) GROUNDS. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, 
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties 
and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion 
for new trial in an action tried without a jury, the 
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Court may open the judgment if one has been entered, 
take additional testimony, amend findings of fact 
and conclusions of law or make new findings and 
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the Court, 
jury or adverse party or any order of the Court, 
or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the 
party making the application, which he could not, 
with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial. 
(c) AFFIDAVITS, TIME FOR FILING. When the 
application for a new trial is made under subdivision 
(a)(1) . . . or (4) it shall be supported bv affidavit. 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon 
affidavits, they shall be served with the motion. 
(Emphasis added) 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND A JUDGMENT. 
A motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be served 
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
RULE 60(b) URCP: RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER. 
(b) MISTAKES; INADVERTENCE; EXCUSABLE NEGLECT; 
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE; FRAUD, ETC. On motion and 
upon such terms as are just, the Court may in the 
furtherance of justice, relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; 
(2) Newly discovered evidence which, by due diligence, 
could not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) Fraud . . . 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) The judgment is void; (5) The judgment has 
been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; 
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2) or 
(3), not more than three months after the judgment, 
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order or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion 
under this subdivision (b) does not effect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. 
This rule does not limit the power of a Court to 
entertain an independent action to relieve a party 
from a judgment, order or proceeding, or to set aside 
a judgment for fraud upon the Court. The procedure 
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these Rules or by an independent 
action. (Emphasis added) 
RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
RULE 4-506. WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES 
Set forth in Appellant's Brief 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appeal from the Judgment and Order that denied Appellant's 
Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment by the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Tyrone E. 
Medley, entered November 14, 2001. (R. 261-262; R. 265-266) 
The Notice of Appeal did not state Appellant appealed from the 
Order and Judgment of the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, entered October 15, 
2001 denying Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment, granting 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the action, and her Rule 11 Motion 
awarding attorney's fees and costs to Respondent. (R. 244-246; 
R. 265-266) 
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V. 
PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant filed a Complaint with the Third District Court, 
Case No. 010901910, on or about March 5, 2001, entitled 
"DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION and URCP 60(b) ACTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT," challenging the Decree of Divorce rendered by Judge 
Sandra N. Peuler, entered on October 22, 1996; and the unpublished 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, November 4, 1999, Case No. 
990666 CA, affirming a post Decree Judgment of the lower Court and 
denying Appellant's second Appeal from the Decree of Divorce. 
(R. 1-2; R. 10-24) 
Appellant was represented by Attorney Ronald C. Barker until 
his withdrawal in the early stages of the proceedings, March 21, 
2001. Mr. Barker withdrew at the time he was advised Appellee was 
filing a Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions that was served by mailing to 
Attorney Barker on March 21, 2001, and filed with the Court on 
April 12, 2001, after receiving Appellant's response. (R. 35; 
R. 44, 49-57) 
Notice to Appoint Counsel was mailed to Appellant on March 23, 
2001. (R. 31-32) Appellant mailed his response to the Motion for 
Rule 11 Sanctions to Appellee's attorney on or about April 9, 2001, 
but did not file this response with the Court. (R. 59; R. 71) 
Appellee's attorney, assuming that Appellant had filed his response 
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to the Rule 11 Motion with the Court, filed a reply to Appellant's 
unfiled response on April 12, 2001 in compliance with Rule 
4-501(1)(c) CJA. (R. 43-48) Appellant filed his Pro se Notice of 
Appearance on April 16, 2001, and filed an Amended Response to the 
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, requesting oral argument on April 26, 
2001. (R. 58; R. 59-70) Appellee filed her Reply to the Amended 
Response of Appellant on May 3, 2001. (R. 71-79) 
On May 18, 2001, Appellant filed a Motion and Memorandum for 
Summary Judgment, requesting oral argument. Both the Motion and 
Memorandum were filed in duplicate (R. 85-122; R. 123-150) 
Appellee filed her Reply Memorandum in opposition to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment and to dismiss the action of Petitioner on May 24, 
2001. (R. 151-154) Appellant filed his reply in support of his 
Motion for Summary Judgment on June 15, 2001, with a Notice to 
Submit for Decision. (R. 156-164) 
Notice of Oral Argument was mailed by the trial Court to the 
respective parties on June 26, 2001. Appellant filed a "Summary of 
Proposed Oral Argument" on July 26, 2001, four (4) days before the 
scheduled hearing. The Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions, the Motion 
for Summary Judgment and the Motion to Dismiss the Declaratory 
Action were heard as scheduled by the trial Court on July 30, 2001. 
At the conclusion of this hearing, the Court, the Honorable Tyrone 
E. Medley, granted the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, denied 
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgement, granted Appellee's Motion 
7 
to Dismiss the Declaratory Action and awarded attorney's fees to 
Appellee. (R. 186; R. 238-246) 
Appellant filed a Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the 
Judgment on August 7, 2001, before entry of the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and the Judgment and Order of Dismissal, 
pursuant to the July 30, 2001 hearing. (R. 187-205; R. 238-246) 
(Tr. 227 p. 3) Appellee filed her Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, August 16, 2001. (R. 225) 
Appellant filed his Reply in support of the Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment on August 23, 2001, together with duplicate Notice 
to Submit for Decision. (R. 226-233) 
Hearing on Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment was 
held on October 15, 2001, pursuant to notice from the Court mailed 
to the respective parties. (R. 236-237) The Court, after hearing, 
denied Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, awarding 
additional attorney's fees to the Appellee in connection with 
Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (R. 250-263) 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on December 14, 2001, from the 
Final Judgment of November 14, 2001 that denied Appellant's Rule 
59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment giving rise to the question 
that this Appeal is limited to that Judgment and Order. (R. 261-
263; R. 265) 
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VI. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellant, by the Complaint filed in this action entitled 
"DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION and URCP 60(b) ACTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT," attempted to re-litigate the prior divorce action, Case 
No. 954904707, that he had appealed twice to the Utah Court of 
Appeals and the denials of those Appeals (R. 1-24). 
2. Appellant, by virtue of URCP 60(b) sought to challenge the 
Decree of Divorce, a third time, four (4) years after entry on 
October 22, 1996, and the unpublished decision of this Court, Case 
No. 99066 CA (1999 Ut. App. 312), after the denial of the Appeals 
to the Utah Court of Appeals, the denials of his Petitions for 
Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme 
Court that were matters of Court record before commencement of this 
action. (R.22-30; R.49-57) 
(a) The Decree of Divorce entered by the Third 
District Court, appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by Petitioner on November 7, 1996, Case No. 960720 CA, 
was affirmed by decision of the Court of Appeals 
September 25, 1997. 
(b) The Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the 
Utah Supreme Court from the decision of the Utah Court 
of Appeals filed by Petitioner on November 14, 1997, 
Case No. 97054-SC was denied on February 26, 1998. 
(c) The Petition for Extraordinary Writ to the 
Utah Supreme Court filed by Petitioner on December 12, 
1997, Case No. 970586 was denied January 14, 1998, 
together with the request for hearing. 
(d) The second Appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
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from the divorce action that included a constitutional 
challenge to the Utah divorce statutes, Case No. 990666-CA, 
was denied November 4, 1999. (R. 3; R. 22-23; R. 45) 
Appellant's Petition for Certiorari to the Utah Supreme 
Court was denied. (R. 3; R. 26) 
(e) Appellant filed three (3) separate Petitions 
for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court. All were denied, to-wit: 
(i) The first Petition filed on April 9, 
1998, Docket No. 97-1677 from the denial of the 
first Appeal of the Divorce Decree presented for 
review the question; "Do State Court's violate 
the 14th Amendment to United States Constitution 
when they deny us the opportunity to preserve 
our marriage?" This Petition was denied on June 
22, 1998. (R. 56) 
(ii) The second Petition filed on May 15, 
1999, Docket No. 97-1848, from the denial of the 
first Appeal of the Divorce Decree and the Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court 
presented for review the question; "By adding 
irreconcilable difference to divorce statutes, 
the States have created a no-fault divorce trend 
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. 
As a matter first impression, are spouses provided 
adequate notice of what conduct is forbidden? Is 
it drawn so imprecisely that it encourages 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law? 
Is it so broad that it sanctions conduct which 
States are not entitled to regulate or ensnare 
couples whose marriages can be preserved? Does it 
extend the State's police power beyond their 
compelling interest, deny procedural due process 
and threaten fundamental and express constitutional 
rights?" (emphasis added) This Petition was denied on 
October 5, 1998. (R. 57) 
(iii) The third Petition filed on June 5, 
2000, Docket No. 99-1997, from the granting of 
Summary Disposition of the second Appeal of the 
Divorce Decree to the Utah Court of Appeals 
presented for review the questions: 
(1) "In light of Troxel v. Granville, 
(decided June 5, 2000) whether 30-3-5 of 
Utah Code impairs the role of fit parents 
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in family decisions beyond constitutional 
limits?" 
(2) "Whether parental and property 
protection of the Bill of Rights and 14th 
Amendment are pre-empted by State's 
interest in the marital status?" 
(3) "Article III of the Utah Constitution 
creates unique Federal property/religion right 
that "shall be irrevocable without the consent 
of the United States." (subparagraphs omitted) 
(4) "Whether determination of constitutionality 
of the statute by the Utah Court of Appeals, 
after silencing the father by eliminating briefing, 
hearing transcripts and argument, violates due 
process and First Amendment protection of free 
speech and "to the Petition to the Government?" 
This Petition was denied October 2, 2000. (R. 3; R. 28) 
(See Addendum #1) 
3. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Troxel 
v. Granville, that affirmed the Washington State Supreme Court's 
decision declaring Washington Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) Third Party 
Visitation statute unconstitutional, addressed visitation rights of 
third parties and grandparents and did not encompass the Washington 
divorce statutes. The trial Court, Judge Medley, concluded that 
res judicata was a bar and precluded Appellant's declaratory 
action, "in that the issues presented, for the most part, have been 
previously resolved. That a reasonable interpretation of the 
decision in Troxel would not have the broad application suggested 
by Mr. Joos, that all of the divorce laws of the State of Utah are 
unconstitutional." (Tr. 266 p.41-42) 
4. The related Petition for Writ of Certiorari referenced in 
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Appellants Brief under the heading "STATEMENT OF FACTS" paragraph 
7 at page 20, was denied by order of the Utah Supreme Court 
effective September 17, 2002, and a Petition for rehearing was 
rejected on October 2, 2002. 
5. Appellant's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
was not supported by Affidavit and attempted to introduce new 
issues and evidence not previously presented and not newly 
discovered. The hearsay statements were objected to by Appellee. 
(R. 187-205; R. 206-225; Tr. 227 p. 20-21) Judge Medley denied 
the Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment on the basis and finding, 
"the Motion to be wholly insufficient, that the prior ruling of the 
Court was not error and Mr. Joos was not denied any of his due 
process rights." Appellee was awarded additional attorney's fees 
consistent with Utah Code Section 78-33-10. (R. 227, Tr. p. 45) 
(See Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Marchant. 615 P.2d 423 (Ut. 1980) 
In his Brief, Appellant has made contradictory or misleading 
statements, together with an unsupported statement regarding the 
withdrawal of his attorney, Mr. Barker. (R. 43-48; R. 59; R. 215; 
Appellant's Brief pg. 38-39) The cases cited by Appellant, 
Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey; K.S and K.S. v. S.H. and G. .H. ; State ex 
rel S.A. are clearly distinguishable from this case having little 
or no application. The majority of quotes from these cases are 
taken out of context. 
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VII. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Appellant was not entitled to a judgment as a mater of law 
and denial of Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment was not 
error. Dismissal of the Declaratory Judgment action was proper and 
not error on the basis and finding that the decision of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville did not overrule the prior 
decision of this Court on the second Appeal of the divorce action 
and did not declare the Utah divorce statutes to be 
unconstitutional. (R. 226 Tr. p. 41-42) Appellant's third Petition 
to the U.S. Supreme Court for Certiorari based on Troxel was 
denied. An intelligent reading of the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
in Troxel clearly refutes Petitioner's claim that this decision 
renders unconstitutional Titles 30 and 78 of the Utah Code and 
establishes his claim to be without merit. The U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Troxel is limited to the rights of parents vs. rights 
of third parties to visitation with children in the control of 
parents or guardians, not as between divorced parents. (R. 75-78; 
R. 99(4); R. 101-102(8); R. 239-243) The U.S. Supreme Court, 
finding no basis for a remand, limited its decision to the Court's 
application of the Washington statute and recognized the burden of 
continuing litigation and the cost incurred to Granville. (R. 103) 
Appellant's continuing litigation is an unwarranted burden to 
Appellee and the Courts. 
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2. Res Judicata is a bar to Appellant's declaratory action. 
Appellant's URCP Rule 60(b) action seeking relief from the Decree 
of Divorce and the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, November 
4, 1999, is barred by Res Judicata and laches in view of the 
subsequent denials of the Petitions for Writs of Certiorari to the 
Utah Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court outlined in the 
pleadings on file and the Statement of Facts herein. (R. 22-30; 
R. 55-57; R. 123-125; R. 226 Tr. p.41-42) 
3. Pursuant to Rule 11 URCP, the Summons and Complaint in 
this action, signed by Appellant's attorney, Ronald C. Barker, an 
experienced attorney, represents and certifies to the Court, based 
on his knowledge, information and belief, formed after reasonable 
inquiry that this action was not brought to harass or increase the 
cost of litigation to Appellee, or that the claims and contentions 
of the Appellant are warranted by existing law or by a non-
frivolous argument for the extension, modification or renewal of 
existing law or the establishment and new law (emphasis added). 
Having full knowledge of the denied prior Appeals, Petitions for 
Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court and the United States 
Supreme Court, Appellant, by this action, attempted to re-litigate 
the prior divorce action and matters that had already been decided 
and disposed of, in violation of Rule 11(b) (1) & (2) , Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (R. 49-58) 
4. Appellant, having received the Rule 11 Motion, his 
attorney having withdrawn, did not avail himself of the opportunity 
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to withdraw or correct the challenged pleading, pursuant to Rule 11 
URCP(c)(1)(A). (R. 49-57; R. 72) Appellant continued to pursue 
his claims of denial of due process; that the Utah divorce statutes 
are unconstitutional; and that the Decree of Divorce and decision 
of this Court on the second Appeal of the divorce action to be 
overruled by Troxel. The trial Court found these claims to be 
frivolous, warranting the imposition of sanctions. (R. 58-70; R. 
71-79; R. 85-103; R. 226 Tr. p. 43-44) 
5. Denial of Appellant's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment by the trial Court was not an abuse of discretion or 
error. The Motion was not supported by Affidavit and was defective 
on its face. Failure to comply with the requirements of 
subparagraph (c) , when the motion is made on the grounds in 
subdivisions (1) and (4) mandating an Affidavit that shall be 
served with the Motion was fatal to Appellant's Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment. Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission, 95 P.2d 125 
(Ut. App. 1997), Cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Ut. 1997); Thorlev v. 
Kolob Fish and Game Club, 13 Ut.2d, 294, 373 P.2d 574 (1962). 
Appellant's claims of denial of due process, bias or prejudice, 
nisconduct by the trial judge, and misconduct on the part of 
counsel for Appellee, were without merit. (R. 187-196; R. 206-221; 
I. 250-263; R. 277 Tr. p. 45) 
6. Contrary to the position of Appellant, Rule 4-506, Code of 
udicial Administration, is procedural, not jurisdictional and 
ubstantial compliance was not error. Appellant mis-states and/or 
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misquotes subparagraph (4) of this Rule. 
7. Appellee is entitled to be awarded attorney's fees and 
costs she has incurred incident to this Appeal. Marshall v. 
Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 517 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996) 
VIII. 
ARGUMENT 
DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DISMISSAL OF THE DECLARATORY ACTION WAS NOT ERROR 
AS A MATTER OF LAW 
As a general rule, for an Appeal from the Order of July 30, 
2001 denying Summary Judgment and dismissing the declaratory action 
to be properly raised, the Notice of Appeal, shall designate the 
judgment or order appealed from. (URAP 3(d)) Appellant did not 
mention the Order of July 30, 2001 in the Notice of Appeal. 
(R. 264) This requirement is jurisdictional and the Order of July 
30, 2001 is not properly before the Court. Jensen v. Intermountain 
Power Agency, 1999 Ut. 10 f7, 997 P.2d 474 (citations omitted) 
The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville 
(supra), centered on a Washington State Statute for third Party 
(grandparents) visitation with children in control of parents or 
guardians, not as between divorced parents and its application by 
the Superior Court. Justice O'Connor, writing the majority opinion 
that affirmed the Washington State Supreme Court, declared the 
broadly worded statute unconstitutional, stating at page 2056: 
(b) Washington's breathtakingly broad statute 
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effectively permits a Court to disregard and 
overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent 
concerning visitation whenever a third party 
affected bv the decision files a visitation 
petition, based solely on the judge's determination 
of the child's best interest. A parent's 
estimation of the child's best interest is 
accorded no deference. The State Supreme Court 
had the opportunity, but declined, to give 
§26.10.160(3) a narrower reading. A combination 
of several factors compels the conclusion that 
S26.10.160(3) as applied here exceeded the bonds 
of due process clause . . . . The problem here 
is not that the Superior Court intervened, but 
that when it did so, it gave no special weight 
to Granville's determination of her daughter's 
best interest. More importantly, that Court 
appears to have applied the opposite presumption, 
favoring grandparent visitation. In effect, it 
placed on Granville the burden of disproving that 
visitation would be in her daughter's best interest 
and thus failed to provide any protection for her 
fundamental right. The Court also gave no weight 
to Granville's having assented to visitation even 
before the filing of the petition or subsequent 
Court intervention. These factors, when considered 
with the Superior Court's slender findings, show 
that this case involves nothing more than a simple 
disagreement between the Court and Granville concerning 
her childrens' best interest and that the visitation 
order was an unconstitutional infringement on Granville's 
right to make decisions regarding the rearing of her 
children (emphasis added) 
(c) Because the instant decision rests on 
§26.10.160(3)'s sweeping breadth and its application 
here, there is no need to consider the question 
whether the due process clause requires all 
non-parental visitation statutes to include a showing 
of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition 
precedent to granting visitation or to decide the 
precise scope of the parental due process right in 
the visitation context. There is also no reason to 
remand this case for further proceedings, 
(emphasis added) 
rhus, the intelligent reading of the Troxel decision clearly 
refutes Appellant's claim that this decision rendered the Utah 
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divorce statutes, Titles 30 and 78 of the Utah Code 
unconstitutional. Appellant has not shown the finding of the trial 
Court, "that his action based on Troxel to be frivolous," resulting 
in denial of the Motion for Summary Judgment to be an abuse of 
discretion or error as a matter of law. Justice O'Connor went on 
to state at page 2064, that the Court agreed with Justice Kennedy: 
"We do not, and need not, define today the precise 
scope of the parental due process right in the 
visitation context. In this respect, we agree with 
Justice KENNEDY that the constitutionality of any 
standard for awarding visitation turns on the 
specific manner in which that standard is applied 
and that the constitutional protection in this 
area are best "elaborated with care." (Post at 279 
dissenting opinion) Because much State-Court 
adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-
case basis we would be hesitant to hold that 
specific non-parental visitation statutes violate 
due process clause as a per se matter. (R. 102) 
(citations omitted; emphasis added) 
At the time Appellant, Mr. Joos, pursued a direct Appeal from 
the Decree of Divorce to the Utah Court of Appeals, Case No. 960720 
CA, he did not dispute or contest the order of custody, visitation 
or division of property. (R. 276; Tr.p. 32, 34) This Appeal 
centered on the issue of grounds. It is an admitted fact that Mr. 
Joos elected not to contest these issues at trial or the first 
Appeal, stating: 
"My religion forbids me to be an adversary 
to my wife" 
Mr. Joos decided to pursue these issues and the constitutional 
issues after his former wife remarried by his second Appeal that 
was denied. (R. 22-24; R. 276, Tr. p. 32-36) Under these facts 
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and circumstances, Appellant was not entitled to a Summary Judgment 
as a matter of law. 
RES JUDICATA IS A BAR TO THE DECLARATORY ACTION 
AND THE RULE 60(b) URCP ACTION 
As a general rule, the principles of Res Judicata bar 
re-litigation of claims that have been previously litigated between 
the same parties, or could and should have been raised in the first 
action to promote judicial economy by preventing needless 
litigation. In re J.T.T., 877 P.2d 161 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994) The 
attempt by Appellant, by declaratory action, to pursue the same 
issues that had been decided and ruled upon in the divorce action, 
not appealed in the first Appeal and denied in the second Appeal by 
this Court, together with the denials of the Petitions for 
Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court, 
clearly established Res Judicata as a bar to the declaratory and 
Rule 60(b) action. (R. 22-29; R. 55-57) 
As an undisputed fact, Troxel did not address the divorce 
issues of child custody, visitation of parents with their minor 
children, child support, health insurance or the division of 
property and did not establish new law. The Troxel Court was 
cautious, hesitant and reluctant to give a broad application to its 
decision, stating at page 2064: 
"Because much State-Court adjudication in this 
context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would 
be hesitant to hold that specific non-parental 
visitation statutes violate the due process clause 
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as a per se matter. (citations omitted, emphasis 
added) (R. 102) 
The decision of Judge Medley based upon the procedural history 
of this case, including all the appellate decisions, that Res 
Judicata is a bar to the declaratory action and at the same time 
rejecting the broad application of Troxel suggested by Mr. Joos "as 
frivolous" is clearly supported by the facts and record. Denial of 
the Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissal of the declaratory 
action was not error as a matter of law. 
Appellant by challenging the ruling of the trial Court with 
respect to the denial of his Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
dismissal of the declaratory action, together with the denial of 
his Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, has failed to 
meet his obligation to martial the evidence in support of the 
Court's ruling and then demonstrate that the evidence was 
insufficient when viewed in the light less favorable to the Court's 
ruling, warranting denial of this Appeal. Neeley v. Bennett, 51 
P. 3d 724. There is no showing by the Appellant that the 
application of the Utah divorce statutes in his divorce case by the 
trial Court violated his constitutional rights or guarantees. Mr. 
Joos has been afforded due process and access to the Courts at 
every stage of his divorce action from trial through the appellate 
process. In view of the several Appeals and the numerous Petitions 
seeking review, Mr. Joos is abusing his right of process. 
As a matter of law, an action seeking relief from a judgment 
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(Decree of Divorce) under Rule 60(b) URCP must be made within a 
reasonable time. Assuming Rule 60(b) URCP had any application 
after denial of the two Appeals, the Petition for Rehearing, 
Petitions for Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court and the United 
States Supreme Court, as aforesaid, Mr. Joos filed his separate 
action more than four (4) years after entry of the Decree of 
Divorce. The Utah Court of Appeals, in an adoption case, Maertz v. 
Maertz, 827, P.2d 259 (1992) recognized the need for finality in 
adoption proceedings and held: 
"That Plaintiffs action brought 3 1/2 years 
after the adoption order was granted, was not 
brought within a "reasonable time" under subdivision 
(b). (emphasis added) 
Applying this case rule to Mr. Joos actions seeking relief from the 
Decree of Divorce more than four (4) years after entry, after two 
Appeals and the denial of the various Petitions, in the interest of 
finality to divorce action, the defenses of Res Judicata and laches 
are applicable to his Rule 60(b) action. Rule 60(b) URCP was not 
available as a "back door" to re-litigate issues or to challenge 
the decision of this Court on the second Appeal that had been 
resolved by the prior decisions on the Appeals, or that should have 
been resolved had they been properly and timely presented and the 
denials of the various Petitions as aforesaid. (See Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 Ut. App. 110 P.3d 451) Res 
Judicata is a bar to the declaratory action and the action seeking 
relief from the Decree of Divorce under Rule 60(b). 
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APPELLANTS ATTEMPT TO RE-LITIGATE MATTERS 
BARRED BY RES JUDICATA VIOLATES RULE 11 URCP 
Appellant's attorney, Ronald C. Barker, an experienced 
attorney, by signing the Complaint for Declaratory Judgment action 
represented and certified to the Court, based on his knowledge and 
belief formed after reasonable inquiry, that the action was not 
brought to harass or increase the cost to Appellee. Mr. Barker, by 
signing the Complaint, also represented and certified to the Court 
that the claims and contentions of Mr. Joos to be warranted by 
existing law or to be a non-frivolous argument for the modification 
of existing law or the establishment of new law. Being reminded of 
the second Appeal of the divorce by Mr. Joos to the Utah Court of 
Appeals that raised the same constitutional issues and being 
advised of the denials of the Petitions for Rehearing for 
Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court, 
and that Appellee deemed the declaratory action a violation of Rule 
11 URCP, Mr. Barker mailed his Withdrawal of Counsel on March 21, 
2001, the same day that the Rule 11 Motion requesting sanctions was 
mailed to Mr. Barker. (R. 35; R. 49-57) 
As an undisputed fact, Troxel clearly did not encompass the 
Washington divorce statutes and did not address the issues of 
custody of minor children, child support, division of property or 
health insurance and did not establish new law.. It is an 
admitted fact, that Mr. Joos did not contest the Order and Decree 
of Divorce on these issues at the time of the divorce trial or by 
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his first Appeal from the Decree of Divorce to this Court. 
Further, Mr. Barker and Mr. Joos had actual knowledge of the 
decision of this Court on the second Appeal that summarily affirmed 
the post Decree Order and Judgment of the trial Court and denied 
Mr. Joos' unconstitutional claims. (R.2; R. 22-23) That decision 
filed November 4, 1999 (1999 Ut. App. 312) determined Mr. Joos 
challenge to the distribution of private property to be barred by 
res judicata. His effort to modify child custody and visitation 
was to be raised by a proper petition to modify the Decree of 
Divorce. Mr. Joos' claim that the District Court lacked 
"constitutional jurisdiction" over the parties divorce proceedings, 
together with his claim the Utah divorce statutes relating to 
children, property, debts or obligations of the parties and 
granting continuing jurisdiction over these subjects, discriminate 
against marriage persons, are vague, over broad and violate equal 
protection guarantee were found by this Court to be without merit 
and rejected. (R. 22-23) Under these circumstances, coupled with 
the knowledge of the denials of the various Petitions to the Utah 
Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court, the filing of the 
declaratory action constituted abuse of process and harassment of 
Appellee, a violation of Rule 11(b)(1). The argument advanced by 
Appellant that Troxel overruled the decision of this Court (Case 
No. 990666CA) rendering the Utah divorce statutes unconstitutional 
violated Rule 11(b)(2). This argument was frivolous and is refuted 
by an intelligent reading of the Troxel decision. 
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Mr. Joos, nor his attorney, Mr. Barker, availed themselves of 
the opportunity to withdraw or correct the challenge pleadings 
under Rule 11(c)(1)(A). Mr. Joos, after withdrawal of his 
attorney, continued to pursue the claims barred by res judicata and 
his frivolous argument that Troxel overruled the decision of this 
Court and declared the Utah divorce statutes to be 
unconstitutional, warranting the trial Court granting the Rule 11 
Motion and imposing sanctions by awarding attorney's fees and costs 
to Appellee. 
DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT WAS NOT ERROR 
Appellant's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
alleging irregularity in the proceedings by the adverse party and 
the Court, to-wit: misconduct of counsel, denial of due process, 
violation of Rule 4-506(4) CJA, judicial misconduct and bias, was 
not supported by the required affidavit, or the record and was 
without merit, warranting denial by the trial Court. Hart v. Salt 
Lake County Commission (supra) Appellant's attempt to introduce 
new issues and evidence without the required affidavit mandated by 
Rule 59(c), rendered the Motion defective on its face. The Motion 
being wholly insufficient, the denial of the Motion by the trial 
Court was not abuse of discretion or error. Thorley v. Kolob Fish 
and Game Club (supra) . The transcripts of both hearings (R. 276-
277) preponderate against Appellant and favors denial of the Motion 
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to Alter or Amend Judgment by the trial Court within its 
discretionary authority. Appellant received notice from the Court 
more than thirty (30) days before the date set for hearing on his 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Appellee's Motions. Appellant did 
not object to this notice or the amount of time the trial Court had 
reserved for hearing on the respective Motions. During Appellant's 
presentation, the Court requested that Mr. Joos address his most 
important point to show how Troxel applied to the Utah divorce 
laws, and why res judicata does not apply, and respond to 
Respondent's Rule 11 Motion and Motion to Dismiss. (R. 276, Tr. p. 
14-17; 38) Appellant did not follow the Court's instruction and 
did not adequately respond. (R. 276) 
Appellant's claim of prejudicial misconduct by the Court was 
without substance or merit. The proceedings held July 30, 2001 
were conducted in a proper, dignified and orderly manner in 
compliance with Canon 3, subparagraphs (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8), 
:ode of Judicial Conduct. Judge Medley performed his judicial 
iuties without bias or prejudice. There was no manifestation by 
rords or conduct amounting to bias or prejudice based upon 
eligion. It was not bias or prejudice for the Court to restrict 
rgument and presentation to the Motions and issues that were 
efore the Court. It was a contradiction on the part of Appellant 
o claim that the Court, by rendering its decision at the 
Dnclusion of the hearing in compliance with Canon 3, subparagraph 
i) to be denial of due process evidencing bias of the Court. 
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Appellant's religious beliefs were not an issue in the proceedings 
until he interjected his religious belief at the close of his 
presentation with regard to the original divorce action. Judge 
Medley was prepared to make his ruling before Appellant's 
unexpected comment regarding his religious beliefs and the response 
of Respondent's counsel. Neither influenced or had any bearing on 
the decision of the Court. The response by Respondent's counsel 
did not ridicule or belittle Petitioner's belief as he claimed and 
characterized. (R. 276, Tr. p. 40-41) Appellant's claim of bias 
or prejudice appears to be based on the fact of the Court's ruling, 
at the conclusion of the hearing, being adverse to him. This alone 
does not constitute bias or prejudice. Absent error, or if an 
error occurred, absent a showing that the error was substantial and 
prejudicial, that Appellant was deprived in some manner of a full 
and fair consideration of the disputed issues, the claim of bias or 
prejudice based on the alleged violations of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct is without factual basis or merit warranting denial of the 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. Promax Development v. Madsen. 
943 P.2d 247 (Ut. App. 1997) 
The provisions of Rule 61 URCP is applicable with respect to 
Appellant's claim of error. Appellant fails to establish error in 
fact, or if there was error, it was not harmless. Appellant has 
not met his burden to show substantial and/or prejudicial error. 
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Ut. 1987) Appellant has not met 
his obligation to marshal 1 the evidence and to meet the 
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requirements of Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
His Brief, on this issue, contains numerous citations to authority 
without development and reasoned analysis based on that authority. 
His reliance on Troxel was misplaced and frivolous. Quotes from 
cases cited are taken out of context. The Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment being wholly insufficient, denial was not error. Also, 
Appellant having failed to adequately present his constitutional 
arguments warrants denial of this Appeal. (State v. Jaeger f 31 973 
P.2d 404 S. Ct. 1999) 
RULE 4-506 CJA IS PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPLIANCE NOT ERROR 
Appellant takes the position that the trial Court lacked 
jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sanctions asserting the Motion to 
have been filed during the 20 day prohibition on "PROCEEDINGS." 
Under the true facts and circumstances, Appellant's position is 
without merit. Rule 4-506 is procedural, not jurisdictional. The 
20 day prohibition of subparagraph (4) referred to by Appellant as 
:he "safe harbor" applies to the "holding of proceedings by the 
Jourt" not the filing of Motions or other pleadings. This Court in 
ipporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 Ut. App. 175, 982 P.2d 586, stated: 
"Because this Rule compels opposing counsel 
to file a required notice and also directs the 
trial Court to wait 20 days after that filing before 
holding further proceedings, the Court errored by 
striking a wife's pleadings and placing her in 
default after granting her counsel's Motion to 
Withdraw. 
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Based on this decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, it is clear 
that the 20 day prohibition is against the trial Court "holding 
proceedings," not the filing of motions or other pleadings. 
Proceedings or legal proceedings is defined in Black's Law 
Dictionary, 4th Edition, at page 1368 as follows: 
In a general sense, the form and manner of 
conducting judicial business before a court or 
judicial officer . . . the term is mainly applicable, 
in a legal sense, only to judicial acts before some 
judicial tribunal. 
The existing facts in this case clearly establish that there was 
compliance with Rule 4-506(4) CJA and the filing of the Rule 11 
Motion in compliance with Rule 11 URCP was not error. The Motion 
for Rule 11 Sanctions was mailed to Appellant's attorney March 21, 
2001, the same day that Mr. Barker signed and mailed his Withdrawal 
of Counsel. The provisions of Rule 11(c)(1)(A) provides: 
A motion for sanctions under this Rule shall 
be made separately from other motions or requests 
and shall describe the specific conduct alleged 
to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served 
as provided in Rule 5. but shall not be filed or 
presented to the Court unless, within 21 days 
after service of the motion (or other such periods 
as the Court may prescribe), the challenged paper, 
claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial 
is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected, 
(emphasis added) 
After mailing and service of the Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions on 
Mr. Barker on March 21, 2001, Notice to Appoint Counsel was served 
by mailing to Appellant on March 23, 2001. Appellant mailed his 
response to the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions to Appellee's attorney 
on April 9, 2001. Unknown to Appellee's attorney, Appellant's 
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response was not filed with the Court. Assuming that Appellant had 
filed his response to the Rule 11 Motion with the Court, a reply to 
Appellant's unfiled response was made on April 12, 2001, in 
compliance with Rule 4-501(1)(c) and the Rule 11 Motion was filed 
with the Court April 12, 2001, 22 days after service by mail and 3 
days after receiving the response of Appellant. (R. 35; R. 41-42; 
R. 43-57) Appellant then filed his Notice of Appearance Pro Se on 
April 16, 2001. (R. 58) He filed an amended response to the 
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, requesting oral argument on April 26, 
2001. (R. 59-70) Appellee filed her reply to the amended response 
of Appellant on May 3, 2001 (R. 71-79). The hearing or proceedings 
on the Rule 11 Motion was not held until July 30, 2001, a period of 
nore than 4 months after the Notice to Appoint Counsel. Contrary 
;o the assertion and position of Appellant, under the true facts, 
.here was compliance with Rule 4-506(4) CJA, and the Court did not 
ack jurisdiction with respect to the Rule 11 Motion, to grant the 
otion and impose appropriate sanctions. Contrary to Appellant's 
tatement, his attorney, Mr. Barker, did not withdraw for health 
masons, but for the reasons set forth in Appellee's Brief. 
>pellant's claim that the Court lacked jurisdiction and was barred 
Federal and State law, without citing authority, from granting 
e Rule 11 Motion and imposing sanctions is without merit. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF 
The object of a Notice of Appeal is to advise the opposite 
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party that an Appeal has been taken from a specific judgment in the 
particular case. For an Appeal of the Order of July 30, 2001 to be 
properly raised and to be before this Court, Appellant is required 
to designate the judgment or order appealed from. This requirement 
is jurisdictional. The Order and judgment of July 30, 2001 is not 
properly before this Court in that Appellant failed to mention this 
judgment in the Notice of Appeal. 
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Troxel did 
not overrule the decision of this Court in the second Appeal of the 
divorce action and did not declare the Utah divorce statutes to be 
unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Troxel is to 
be given a narrow application limited to non-parental visitation 
statutes. Under these facts and circumstances, Appellant was not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law and denial of the Motion 
for Summary Judgment by the trial Court was proper and not error. 
Based on the procedural history of the divorce action, res 
judicata was a bar to the declaratory judgment action and Rule 
60(b) URCP was not available to Appellant as a "back door" to 
re-litigate issues that had been resolved by prior Court decisions 
or to challenge the decision of this Court on the second Appeal. 
Dismissal of the declaratory judgment action and Rule 60(b) action 
for relief from judgment was not error and should be affirmed by 
decision of this Court. 
The decision of the trial Court that the declaratory action 
brought by Appellant to be a violation of Rule 11(b)(1) & (2) was 
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established by clear and convincing evidence. Appellant's attempt 
to re-litigate divorce issues barred by res judicata and in view of 
the procedural history of the divorce action, amounted to 
harassment of Appellee and abuse of the legal process by Appellant. 
The argument advanced by Appellant that Troxel overruled the prior 
decision of this Court and declared the Utah divorce statutes 
unconstitutional, found to be frivolous and a violation of Rule 11 
by the trial Court is supported by the clear weight of the record, 
proceedings and evidence in this case. The decision of the trial 
Court should be affirmed. 
Denial of Appellant's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend 
Xudgment, not supported by the required Affidavit, was defective 
md wholly insufficient, requiring denial by the trial Court within 
.ts discretionary authority. The denial of the Motion by the 
rial Court was not error and should be affirmed by the decision of 
his Court. 
Rule 4-506 CJA is procedural and not jurisdictional. The 
listing facts clearly established there was compliance with this 
lie with respect to the filing of the Rule 11 Motion in compliance 
.th Rule 11 URCP. The hearing or proceedings on the Rule 11 
>tion was not held until July 30, 2001, a period of more than 4 
nths after the Notice to Appoint Counsel was served, after 
pellant's reply to the Motion, his appearance pro se and amended 
ply to the Motion. Appellant's claim that the Court lacked 
risdiction and was barred by law from granting the Rule 11 Motion 
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is unsupported and without merit and should be rejected by this 
Court. 
Appellee, having been awarded attorney's fees, pursuant to the 
proceedings in the trial Court, warrants this Court awarding 
Appellee her attorney's fees pursuant to his Appeal as a matter of 
law. 
Respectfully submitted this day of November, 2002. 
EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER 
Attorney for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to Ronald C. Barker, Attorney for Appellant, 
addressed to him at 2870 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84115 on this day of November, 2002. 
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DAN RODNEY JOOS, 
Petitioner, 
versus 
PIPER C. JOOS (MONTE), 
Respondent. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Dan Rodney Joos, pro se petitioner 
c/o Dr. Gene R. Fuller 
2446 East Sabal 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone (801) 944-5870 
immmak*m*mm. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. In light of Troxel v. Granville (decided June 5, 2000) 
whether § 30-3-5 of the Utah Code impairs the role of fit 
parents in family decisions beyond constitutional limits. 
2. Whether parental and property protections of the Bill of 
Rights and Fourteenth Amendment are pre-empted by 
states' interest in "the marital status." 
3. Article HI of the Utah Constitution creates a unique 
federal property/religion right that "shall be irrevocable 
without the consent of the United States." 
a. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires the 
state to regulate joint property of religious 
parents who married the same as joint property of 
cohabiting parents. 
b. When religious beliefs preclude hostility, can 
states take the Father's property without 
compensation by refusing to allow non-
adversarial procedures? 
c. To resolve the conflict of state courts, whether 
the "continuing jurisdiction" over "property" 
must be interpreted the same as a "continuing 
jurisdiction" over "custody, support, health and 
debts." 
4. Whether determination of constitutionality of the statute 
by the Utah Court of Appeals, after silencing the Father 
by eliminating briefing, hearing transcripts and 
argument, violates due process and First Amendment 
protections of free speech and "to petition the 
government." 
II 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
(The State of Utah is a party) 
Dan is homeless. For years he has been without heat in 
winter, sleeps on the ground and showers at truck stops because 
the home and furnishings that he bought and paid for as 
breadwinner belong to the state, the decision making party, to 
use for the benefit of the children. The state claims to be a party 
in all property and parental decisions because Piper and Dan 
made a religious and responsible choice to marry rather than 
have children out of wedlock. 
This petition seeks to eliminate the jurisdiction of the 
state as a "continuing" party over property and parental choices 
of fit parents who married. Although the Court of Appeals says 
in its decision, "when [the marital] status is created, the rights 
involved are not merely private, but are also of public 
concern....," the state should no longer be an eternal party with 
unlimited power over the property and children, and should be 
limited to defining and preserving marriages. 
No longer should the children be "the mere creature of 
the State." (Troxel v. Granville 530 U.S. [2000] page 7) 
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A. The U.S. marriage rate is at an all time low, 
1/3 of this nation's children are born out of 
wedlock and in 1998 "more than 31,000 babies 
were delivered in hospitals and left there by 
mothers" because state judges displace fathers 
by assuming control, burden parents who 
married and discriminate in favor of 
cohabiting and single parents 9 
B. States and the Utah Court of Appeals have 
expanded states' interest in marriage into a 
lifelong business regulating property and 
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parental decision-making of fit parents who 
have broken no laws. State judiciaries cause 
conflict, are unfair to fathers and have 
invalidated constitutional protections of 
parents who make a moral and religious 
choice to marry 17 
C. Although nearly half of the Utah Supreme 
Court stepped down from the bench after 
complaints were filed with the Judicial 
Conduct Commission, the Court of Appeals 
seeks to maintain the status quo and prevent 
improved treatment of families by 
circumventing the First Amendment and 
limiting the father's right of appeal to merely 
posing the constitutional questions the 
Commission said the "appellate court" should 
decide 23 
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No. 
Sntlje 
Supreme Court 
oftlje 
WLnitzb States* 
October Term, 1999 
DAN RODNEY JOOS, 
Petitioner, 
versus 
PIPER C. JOOS (MONTE), 
Respondent. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Petitioner respectfully requests that a writ of certiorari issue 
to review the judgment, opinion and constitutional jurisdiction of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The Utah District Court did not expressly pass on the 
constitutionality of the statute, leaving that duty to the appellate courts 
as encouraged by the Judicial Conduct Commission; therefore, only 
the opinions of the Utah Court of Appeals are in this petition. 
2 
The decision of the Judicial Conduct Commission is an 
unpublished letter. 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals regardmg 
constitutionality of Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, is in form of a memorandum decision designated "not for 
official publication." Similarly it's order that denied the petition for 
reheanng, addressing due process and First Amendment violations, is 
unpublished. 
All the above decisions are reproduced in the Appendix to this 
petition. 
JURISDICTION 
The judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals was entered on 
November 4,1999. A petition for reheanng, timely filed, was denied 
on December 17, 1999. The order denying discretionary review by 
the Utah Supreme Court was entered March 13, 2000. 
The junsdiction of this court is mvoked under 28 U.S.C. § 
1257. 
The constitutionality of Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended is m question. 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) may apply and 
shall be served on the Attorney General of Utah. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH - ARTICLE m 
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the 
consent of the United States and the people of this State: 
First: - Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed. 
No inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested m person or 
property on account of his or her mode of religious worship; but 
polygamous or plural marnages are forever prohibited. 
1896 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
ARTICLE VI 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the Contrary notwithstanding. 
AMENDMENT I - Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT TV - The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.... 
AMENDMENT V - Section l....nor shall any person....be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
AMENDMENT IX - The enumeration in the Constitution, of 
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
- retained by the people. 
AMENDMENT X - The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. 
AMENDMENT XIV - Section l....No State shall make or 
enforce, any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
4 
STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
Husband and Wife 
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children - Division of debts - Court to have 
continuing jurisdiction -
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts 
or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in 
every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the 
dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, 
an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate 
health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their 
support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of 
the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 10. Motion for summary disposition 
(e) Ruling of court. The court, upon its own motion, and on 
such notice as it directs, may dismiss an appeal or petition for review 
if the court lacks jurisdiction; or may summarily affirm the judgment 
or order which is the subject of review, if it plainly appears that no 
substantial question is presented; or may summarily reverse in cases 
of manifest error. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Like many cases, Troxel v. Granville (2000) addresses the 
after-effects of broken homes. The present case gives the Supreme 
Court the opportunity to change laws that cause families to fail. The 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FILED 
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Piper C. Joos, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Dan Rodney Joos, 
Defendant and Appellant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
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Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Sandra Peuler 
Attorneys: Dan Rodney Joos, Salt Lake City, Appellant Pro Se 
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Before Judges Wilkins, Bench, and Orme. 
PER CURIAM: 
Dan Rodney Joos appeals from an Order Denying 
Respondent's Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation. 
The case is before us on Piper C. Joos' motion for summary 
disposition. 
Appellee first contends the appeal should be dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction. A signed minute entry can constitute a 
final appealable judgment only where it is both dispositive and 
A-2 
clearly intended to serve as the final order. See Swenson Assoc. 
Architects v. State, 889 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1994). Where, as 
in the present case, the minute entry directs counsel to prepare an 
order containing the court's ruling, the minute entry cannot serve 
as a final appealable order. Id. The appeal was timely taken from 
the final order subsequently entered on July 6,1999. 
Appellee also argues that the appeal presents no 
substantial question and that appellant's arguments are precluded 
by res judicata. Appellant pursued a direct appeal from the 
divorce decree, which resulted in affirmance of the decree. 
Appellant subsequently filed motions in the district court seeking 
to set aside the division of private property and force appellee to 
renegotiate, to modify visitation and custody, and to declare 
statutes giving the court jurisdiction over divorce proceedings 
unconstitutional. Appellant also moved to have all motions 
considered by the district court judge rather than the 
commissioner. The relief sought by appellant was denied. We 
conclude that the judgment should be summarily affirmed. 
Appellant's challenge to the distribution of private 
property should have been raised on direct appeal and is barred 
by res judicata. Similarly, appellant's efforts to modify child 
custody and visitation must be raised by a proper petition to 
modify the decree that demonstrates, as a threshold matter, that 
a substantial change of circumstances has occurred since the 
entry of the decree. See Utah Admin. Code P. R6-404; see also 
Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985) ("In the 
absence of [a showing of substantial change of circumstances] 
the decree shall not be modified and the matters previously 
litigated and incorporated therein cannot be collaterally attacked 
in the faceof the doctrine of res judicata."). 
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Appellant also argues that the district court lacked 
"constitutional jurisdiction"© ver the parties' divorce 
proceedings. Appellant claims that the statutes pertaining to 
divorce, which give the courts jurisdiction to make equitable 
orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations of 
the parties and granting continuing jurisdiction over these 
subjects, discriminate against married persons in favor of 
unmarried or cohabiting persons. Appellant's argument is 
without merit. "When [the marital] status is created, the rights 
involved are not merely private, but are also of public concern 
insofar as they relate to the welfare of families." Neilson v. 
Neilson. 780 P.2d 1264,1269 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). We reject 
appellant's contention that the divorce statutes are vague and 
overbroad or violate equal protection guarantees. 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. Because appellee 
was awarded attorney fees and costs below and has prevailed on 
appeal, this case is remanded to the trial court for an award of the 
costs and attorney fees reasonably incurred by appellee on 
appeal. See Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). 
/§/ 
Michael J. Wilkins, 
Presiding Judge 
/§/ 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
/§/ 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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